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A short period of high growth is a relatively frequent event
even in poor countries (Pritchett, 2000). What is less frequent,
however, are extended periods of high growth. Based on this
observation, many authors argue that the main diﬀerence
between the growth miracles of the last century and the rest
of the developing world is the ability of the former to nurture
a sudden spark of growth into a prolonged spell. There is thus
a growing realization that the key economic challenge the
developing world is facing today is not to generate high
growth rates per se, but to sustain growth once it emerges
(Berg, Ostry, & Zettelmeyer, 2012).
This paper contributes to the nascent literature on the polit-
ical economy of growth spells by exploring whether the impar-
tiality of the government toward diﬀerent ethnic groups is a
signiﬁcant determinant of the incidence of sustained growth
in a sample of sub-Saharan African countries. We ask, in other
words, whether countries with an impartial government are
more likely to turn random sparks of growth into prolonged
spells.
Our dataset covers 20 sub-Saharan African countries from
1999 onward. 1 The empirical strategy is to relate the incidence
of appropriately deﬁned periods of sustained growth to a
survey-based indicator of the perceived impartiality of the
government’s exercise of authority. The results suggest that
as the government becomes more impartial, the likelihood of
sustained growth increases.
Government impartiality is a particularly important issue in
Africa given the continent’s highly fragmented ethnic land-
scape. Many studies suggest that one of the main reasons
for Africa’s dismal growth performance over most of the
20th century is its degree of ethnic fragmentation (Easterly
& Levine, 1997; Posner, 2004). 2 Yet, there is still insuﬃcient
knowledge about whether ethnic diversity necessarily entails
large economic costs, or whether the implications of diversity54depend, inter alia, on the government’s approach toward the
ethnic question (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, &
Weinstein, 2008).
More speciﬁcally, many authors treat public policies in
Africa as an outcome of ethnic divisions. For example,
Easterly and Levine (1997) ﬁnd that the quality of economic
policies and public goods provision is lower in more frag-
mented countries. But government policies, while subject to
prevailing ethnic divisions, are determined by other factors
as well, such as the worldview and goals of its leaders,
constraints on the executive and political accountability, inter-
national political developments, and economic opportunities.
We conjecture that such factors inﬂuence how leaders
approach the diﬀerent ethnicities in their countries, and that
the adopted approach toward the ethnic question, in turn,
aﬀects economic development.
The argument for why government impartiality should
matter for sustained growth is as follows. Growth tends to
increase average incomes, but it also aﬀects the income distri-
bution. If growth is accompanied by growing economic
inequality, the perception of the impartiality of the govern-
ment toward diﬀerent ethnic groups is likely to be important
for whether growth can be sustained, or whether sparks of
growth will evaporate because of rising political divisions
and internal conﬂicts (Alesina, Michalopoulos, &
Papaioannou, 2015). It is not uncommon that the economic
growth disproportionally beneﬁts certain ethnic minorities.
In countries where the ethnic majority is politically dominant,
increasing economic success of minorities might trigger policy
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trend, such as increasing demands for more inter-group redis-
tribution. 3 The economic consequences might be even worse if
growth beneﬁts primarily a politically powerful majority. In
this case, minorities could believe that the government actively
discriminates them, which could lead to ethnic strife, political
conﬂicts, attempts toward secession, or merely to increased
demands for inter-group redistribution. 4 In Section 2, we
elaborate the arguments for why impartiality could be related
also to economic performance in general.
The most closely related previous study is Berg et al. (2012).
They explore various potential determinants of growth spells
with a worldwide sample, and ﬁnd that growth duration is
related to a number of economic and political factors. The
important political factor they identify is democratic institu-
tions, but while they ﬁnd a role of institutions in determining
the length of growth spells, they do not study speciﬁc policies
or how policies are implemented. Our contribution over Berg
et al. (2012) is therefore the focus on the role of a speciﬁc but,
for Africa, important issue: the impartiality of the government
in its dealings with diﬀerent ethnicities.
Another related study is Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian
(2010). By benchmarking the constraints for sustained growth
in Africa, they identify ‘‘societal” fractionalization and inter-
nal conﬂicts as particularly important. A third related study
is Tsangarides (2012), who ﬁnds that the determinants of
growth spells in Africa diﬀer from the rest of the world, and
that in particular factors such as openness and droughts are
more important for African countries. Neither of these two
studies investigates the role of government impartiality.
Our paper is also related to the literature that explores the
determinants of growth accelerations, i.e., periods where
growth begins to increase. One example from this literature
is Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), who ﬁnd that
political regime change causes growth accelerations. Jointly
addressing the relative importance of formal and informal
institutions, Sen (2013) presents theoretical arguments and
supporting evidence that informal institutions matter for
growth accelerations while formal institutions matter more
for growth maintenance. Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock
(2006) use ethnic fragmentation as proxy for social cohesion
and explore how social cohesion and its indirect eﬀect on insti-
tutions is related to annual growth rates (rather than the inci-
dence of growth spells). Their results suggest that institutional
quality matters for how growth responds to social cohesion.
Studies in this strand of the literature also do not address
the role of government impartiality.
This paper also draws insights from the political science liter-
ature on impartiality.While scholars from economics and polit-
ical science mostly agree that good governance is important for
economic development, they tend to diﬀer in their understand-
ing of the deﬁning features of good governance. Economists
tend to favor a broader deﬁnition, one that encompasses both
the implementation and the content of policies. For example,
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) deﬁne governance as
the traditions and institutions that determine whether policies
are ‘‘eﬃcient,” as traditionally understood by economists, as
well as how the policies are exercised, i.e., impartially, demo-
cratically, or authoritarian. Political scientists, in particular
Rothstein and Teorell (2008), instead argue that a useful deﬁni-
tion of good governance should focus only on the ‘‘impartiality
in the exercise of political authority,” irrespective of whether the
policies themselves are ‘‘good” or ‘‘eﬃcient.” The purpose of
our paper is to study whether government impartiality alone
can be an important determinant of growth spells, irrespective
of the content of the policies that are being implemented.The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2
oﬀers a more elaborate discussion on the possible importance
of impartiality. In Section 3, we present our indicators for
government impartiality and sustained growth. Section 4 con-
tains our empirical framework and our regression analysis,
and Section 5 concludes.2. IMPARTIALITY, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
(a) The importance of sustained growth for Africa
Sub-SaharanAfrica is the region of the world that has had the
least success in reducing poverty over the last decades. The rea-
son for this inability is ex-ante unclear. One possible explana-
tion is that African countries do not redistribute suﬃciently
by transferring resources form the rich to the poor. On the other
hand, while inequality is indeed high in Africa, it has not chan-
ged signiﬁcantly over the last three decades (Ravallion & Chen,
2012). Hence, more growth, and not more redistribution,
appears to be the key for poverty reduction in Africa.
There have been many instances of growth accelerations in
African countries, but they have seldom been extended for a
long time. Growth accelerations have become more common
and more sustained only in recent years (Berg et al., 2012),
yet even these recent accelerations have not been evenly dis-
tributed between countries. Arbache and Page (2010) note that
growth in sub-Saharan Africa has become somewhat more
stable since the turn of the century, but they also ﬁnd that this
more stable growth has led neither to improvements in invest-
ments nor to better governance. Thus, the challenge to sustain
growth remains, and it remains important to understand what
does and what does not lead to sustained growth in Africa.
(b) The role of institutions and policies
We now have a broad literature in economics on the role of
institutions for good governance. Kaufmann et al. (2008)
deﬁne governance as the traditions and institutions that deter-
mine how authority is exercised in a particular country. Their
deﬁnition includes three dimensions, namely the process by
which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored,
and replaced; the capacity of governments to manage
resources eﬃciently and formulate, implement, and enforce
sound policies and regulations; and the respect of citizens
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and
social interactions among them.
Institutions tend to be persistent and diﬃcult to change in
the short-run. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) ﬁnd that
inherited property rights institutions are signiﬁcant explana-
tory variables in cross-country growth regressions. La Porta,
Lopes-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, and Schleifer (2008) show that
the (colonial) origin of the legal system determines contempo-
raneous economic development. More recent research on the
role of institutions gives attention to the contemporaneous
features of a country as well. Besley and Persson (2009), for
example, argue that the ability of the state to raise revenues,
its state or administrative capacity, has a positive eﬀect on
development. Dincecco and Prado (2012) oﬀer empirical sup-
port for this hypothesis. Still, both the literature on historical
institutions and contemporaneous state capacity tend to be
concerned with the quality of policies as outcomes of institu-
tions, while they are less concerned with whether these policies
are implemented in an impartial fashion.
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good governance typically employed in economics is too
broad. Good governance requires political equality on the ‘‘in-
put” side of the relationship between a state and its citizens,
and impartiality on the ‘‘output” side. Political equality is
needed in order to ensure equal access to political power. By
their deﬁnition, impartiality, the marker of good governance
on the output side, implies that ‘‘when implementing laws
and policies, government oﬃcials shall not take anything
about the citizen/case into consideration that is not before-
hand stipulated in the policy or the law” (Rothstein &
Teorell, 2008, p. 168). Impartiality in their deﬁnition is thus
a procedural norm that relates to the exercise of authority
and does not concern the content of policies, or how policy
makers are elected. Their deﬁnition is close to what is gener-
ally understood as the rule of law, which is part of
Kaufmann et al.’s (2008) deﬁnition of governance, but still
does not include anything about the quality of policies or
the eﬃciency of the government. They hold that rights are
more important and fundamental than utility, and thus that
‘‘impartiality is always preferable to eﬃciency” (Rothstein &
Teorell, 2008, p. 182). Nevertheless, they contend that impar-
tiality, since it implies meritocratic recruitment rather than
recruitment based on political or clientelistic connections,
may enhance eﬃciency.
Is it reasonable to have such a strong focus on procedures?
To answer this question, we test whether a measure of impar-
tiality can explain the sustainability of economic growth in
Africa. Impartiality can work in one of two ways toward mak-
ing growth more sustained. Impartiality can work because it is
an important determinant of quality of government, or
because it proxies for the broad aspects of quality of gover-
nance suggested by for example Kaufmann et al. (2008). It is
plausible that an impartial government is also rational and
eﬃcient in terms of policy choice. An impartial approach to
government may also be associated with secure property rights
and equality of opportunity, that is, also no ethnic favoritism
(which may reﬂect the inclusive institutions emphasized by
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
There has not yet been an attempt to test whether impartial-
ity leads to sustained growth in Africa. In an unpublished
manuscript, Teorell (2009) uses a cross-section of 52 countries
to explore whether impartial governments have higher annual
economic growth. Only South Africa is included from Africa,
while the sample consists otherwise of developed and Eastern
European countries. Using this small and unusual sample,
Teorell (2009) ﬁnds that there is a signiﬁcant relationship
between impartiality and economic growth.
It is conceivable that the level of impartiality is higher where
the bureaucracy has stronger autonomy. If so, there is indirect
evidence that impartiality matter for government perfor-
mance. Cingolani, Thomsson, and de Crombrugghe (2015)
ﬁnd that bureaucratic autonomy matters more than state
capacity when it comes to ﬁghting child mortality and tubercu-
losis prevalence.
(c) Ethnic divisions, impartiality, and sustainability of
development in Africa
The eﬀect of ethnic divisions on sustainable growth could be
direct or indirect. One could envisage that there is a direct
eﬀect of ethnic diversity, or lack of social cohesion, on eco-
nomic growth and the sustainability thereof. This could take
the form of a lack of trust among economic agents, making
it harder to do business or to organize diﬀerent forms of col-
lective action. To capture this eﬀect our empirical regressionswill, e.g., include a variable that captures the extent to which
an individual identiﬁes with the nation rather than his or her
ethnic group.
The indirect dimension concerns the government’s willing-
ness or ability to decide on and implement policies that
improve the prospects for sustained economic growth. We
hypothesize that it will be harder to pursue an impartial devel-
opment strategy in a society lacking social cohesion or
national consensus. In a divided society, it will be harder both
to agree on the content of policies and to ensure that they are
implemented without speciﬁc groups being favored. Easterly
and Levine (1997) hold that ‘‘Africa’s growth tragedy” can
be explained by reference to how ethnic divisions have fed into
rent-seeking behavior and diﬃculties in agreeing on the provi-
sion of such public goods that are needed for economic
growth. This is in line with more recent ﬁndings that the qual-
ity of government and the provision of public goods are lower
in societies with more social and economic inequalities
between ethnic groups (Baldwin & Huber, 2010; Kyriacou,
2013) and where ethnic groups are spatially more segregated
(Alesina & Zhuravskaya, 2011).
Further, it is commonly asserted that African policy-makers
often favor their co-ethnics and their home region. For
instance, Kramon and Posner (2012) ﬁnd evidence of ethnic
favoritism when it comes to educational outcomes in Kenya,
and Hodler and Raschky (2014) ﬁnd that foreign aid is dispro-
portionately located to the leaders’ home regions. There is also
indirect evidence that higher levels of perceived government
impartiality indicate less real ethno-regional favoritism.
Ahlerup and Isaksson (2015) use the same question in the
Afrobarometer as we use in this paper to construct our indica-
tor of impartiality in their analysis of ethnic and regional
favoritism. They show that respondents are less likely to say
that the government treats their group unfairly if they are
co-ethnics with the president, live in the president’s home
region, or live in a region where a large share of the population
belongs to the president’s ethnic group. It is therefore likely
that lower levels of impartiality, as we measure it, is a reﬂec-
tion of more intensive ethnic or regional favoritism. Consider-
ing that such favoritism implies that governments do not
allocate resources according to objective economic criteria, a
high level of impartiality is a signal that common resources
are allocated to individuals, regions, or sectors where they
are more likely to fulﬁll commonly agreed on goals, such as
to ensure sustained economic growth. Furthermore, a plausi-
ble assumption is that the pressure for between-group distribu-
tion will be lower when people know that the government acts
impartially.
Since a government that acts impartially eﬀectively down-
plays ethnic identities, impartiality may have an eﬀect on
nation-building, often understood as being about forming a
common national identity. There is no agreement in the liter-
ature about the beneﬁts of nation-building policies. One the
one hand, Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013) discuss various
forms of practical nation-building policies in Africa and ﬁnd
them to be associated with a higher risk for conﬂict. They
argue that this is because these policies acted as a ‘‘smoke-
screen to advance the interest of the President and his party”
and also ‘‘were highly controversial and led to more conﬂict
than integration” (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2013, p. 115).
On the other hand, Miguel (2004) argues that nation-
building policies in Tanzania are the reason why there is no
link between ethnic diversity and lower public goods provision
in this country, while such a link is found in neighboring
Kenya. Ahlerup and Hansson (2011) uncover a non-linear
relationship between nationalism and governance; an increase
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ernance if the national identity is low, but worse governance if
national identity is strong.
Nation-building relates to impartiality in the following way.
By acting impartially, a government may over time contribute
to create a common national identity for all its citizens, thus
creating a nation from a diverse landscape of ethnic identities.
In this process, the ethnic group seizes to be important in eco-
nomic and political life as one’s ethnic identity does not aﬀect
how one is treated by the government. However, nation-
building policies have throughout history, as noted by, e.g.,
Tilly (1992), involved rulers actively seeking to homogenize
their populations. Those whose ethnic identity or language is
being forcefully suppressed will indeed not see the government
as acting impartially.
Poor economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa can be
explained by reference to a volatility of revenues, public
investments, and aid (Museru, Toerien, & Gossel, 2014).
Divided societies, and societies with a lack of social cohesion,
may ﬁnd it harder to respond eﬀectively to economic shocks,
as governments in such societies will be less capable of equita-
bly allocating adjustment burdens across groups. It is also
likely that transitions between governments after elections will
be more disruptive in such societies, since the new government
may feel that it is now their group’s turn to get their ‘‘fair
share.” Impartiality could thus imply more stable public poli-
cies, as an impartial government is one that does not act to
beneﬁt those groups that happen to have their members in
power at the time. Consider, for example, the disastrous con-
sequences that followed the Kenyan elections in 2007, where
the opposition felt that the incumbent government had
‘‘stolen” the election (Wrong, 2009).
To sum up the arguments, we contend that there are three
broad categories of mechanisms whereby impartiality may
be linked to sustained growth. First, impartiality implies less
ethno-regional favoritism. Second, impartiality implies less
room for rent-seeking. Third, as the stake in elections will be
lower, there will be more stability in economic and political
conditions. Together, these mechanisms suggest that impar-
tiality could lead to a more eﬃcient use of available resources
and higher social acceptance of potential relative changes in
the income distribution resulting from economic growth.3. DATA
In this section, we ﬁrst describe our main explanatory
variables and then our deﬁnition of sustained growth.
(a) Impartiality
(i) Impartiality index
The main explanatory variable is an index, the Impartiality
index, which represents the share of the population in a coun-
try that thinks that the group they identify with is treated
fairly by the government.
The Afrobarometer (2013) is a pan-African survey project
that since 1999 has led detailed individual-level surveys in an
increasing number of African countries. Starting with 12
countries in the ﬁrst round, they now cover more than 30
countries in the sixth round. To assess the eﬀect of impartiality
on sustained growth, we need a suﬃcient number of years after
the conclusion of each wave to identify sustained growth
periods. The fourth wave, conducted in 2008–09 and covering
20 countries, is therefore the last wave we can use in this
paper. We thus draw data from the ﬁrst four rounds of theAfrobarometer survey, conducted during 1999–2009, and get
a sample that consists of up to 20 countries. During this period,
a total of 66 surveys were made, but the question used to create
the Impartiality index was not asked in two of them; the 1999
survey in Ghana, and the 2005 survey in Zimbabwe.
The following refers to the wordings used in the fourth wave
of the Afrobarometer. There are minor nuances in the exact
phrasing of the relevant questions between the waves, see the
Appendix for details. First, the respondents are asked the
open-ended question ‘‘What is your tribe? You know, your
ethnic or cultural group.” In a follow-up question, they are
asked ‘‘How often are ____s [R’s Ethnic Group] treated
unfairly by the government?” The respondent can chose
between the pre-deﬁned answers ‘‘Never,” ‘‘Sometimes,”
‘‘Often,” and ‘‘Always.” Of these alternatives, only ‘‘Never”
corresponds to an assessment that one’s group is treated
impartially by the government. For this reason, we give each
respondent the value one if they answer ‘‘Never,” and zero
otherwise. We use the sample weights of each respondent to
calculate the share of the population for each country that
has a value of one. Our index thus relies not on the speciﬁc
degree of perceived partiality, but on whether the respondents
perceive it to be altogether absent. A complete list of all obser-
vations of the Impartiality index that can be coded from the
Afrobarometer can be found in Table 5 in the Appendix.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the Impartiality
index and the other variables used in the empirical analysis.
Less than half of the populations in these sub-Saharan African
countries feel that their group is never treated unfairly. There
is considerable variation in perceived government impartiality,
with the lowest value on the Impartiality index (8%) coming
from the 1999 survey in Zimbabwe, and the highest value
(88%) coming from the 2009 survey in Madagascar. Figure 1
shows the Impartiality index averaged by country over the
whole sample period. There is no obvious geographical pat-
tern or clustering, and there is no apparent systematic diﬀer-
ence between countries of the more Francophone West
Africa and the more Anglophone East Africa. The highest
average values are found furthest to the east, Madagascar
(0.87), and furthest to the west, Senegal (0.76).
The Impartiality index builds on answers to a question of
whether individuals perceive that the government has treated
their ethnic group fairly. The respondents are here likely to
consider, e.g., the allocation of public expenditures on items
like education, health, and infrastructure, the allocation of
jobs and positions of inﬂuence, and security-related issues.
All else equal, more people in countries where the government
allocates these along ethnic or regional lines are likely say that
the government treats their group unfairly. That is, the mea-
sured level of the Impartiality index will be lower. Simply
put, people think it is unfair if they do not get their fair share
of government resources or if they are denied their fair share
of inﬂuence. In this African context, we thus primarily believe
that impartiality would mean an absence of ethnic or regional
favoritism. Such favoritism would go against resources being
rationally allocated, in the sense of supporting the poor or
promoting growth.
Ahlerup and Isaksson (2015) ﬁnd that members of the pres-
ident’s ethnic group more seldom feel unfairly treated. This
makes it relevant to ask whether higher levels on the Impartial-
ity index reﬂect that the government acts fairly (impartially)
toward most or all groups or that respondents who belong
to the president’s ethnic group, and therefore are favored by
the government and thus perceive the government to be fair,
make up a larger fraction of the population. We drew informa-
tion on the ethnicity of the president in 2005 from Ahlerup
Table 1. Summary statistics
N Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Sustained growth 64 0.22 0.42 0 1
Impartiality index 64 0.43 0.21 0.08 0.88
Gini 61 50.85 9.97 33.83 74.33
Linguistic fractionalization 61 0.7 0.23 0.02 0.92
Ethnic fractionalization 64 0.67 0.19 0.25 0.93
Religious fractionalization 64 0.61 0.22 0.08 0.86
Polity2 64 5.16 3.75 4 10
GDP per capita 64 2,310.86 2,336.92 396.53 9,695.64
Quality of government 53 0.42 0.1 0.22 0.67
Internal conﬂict 37 8.74 1.53 5.83 12
Government consumption 64 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.28
Natural resource rents 64 9.80 10.80 0.32 47.12
Price level of investment 64 0.53 0.19 0.04 1.25
Inﬂation 60 10.22 7.36 0.29 44.80
Real eﬀective exchange rate 61 99.19 14.65 59.57 154.43
Population size 64 24,142,397 32,333,487 459,140 151,208,080
National identity index 53 0.48 0.17 0.17 0.88
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for observations with data on the Impartiality index.
Figure 1. Average Impartiality index (1999–2009).
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bers of this ethnic group makes a diﬀerence when calculating
the Impartiality index for the third round of the Afrobarome-
ter survey conducted in 2005–06. The eﬀect on the Impartiality
index is surprisingly modest, with a typical change of a few
percentage points or less. We observe the same stability in
the index if we omit respondents from the largest ethnic group
in each country when calculating the index. We are therefore
reasonably certain that the Impartiality index does not simply
capture the relative size of the president’s (potentially favor-
ably treated) ethnic group.
We also calculated the value on the index separately for each
ethnic group within each country. There were between-group
diﬀerences within all these sub-Saharan African countries,
but, importantly, also the lowest group-level values where
clearly higher in countries where the value on the (country-
level) Impartiality index was higher. Therefore, higher values
on the Impartiality index do not simply come from a better
treatment of major population groups, but also reﬂect thatmembers of the least favored groups in each country report
that they feel more fairly treated. 5
(ii) Relationship between the impartiality index and other
indicators of democracy and government
The theoretical concept of impartiality is a distinct one, but
can what is measured by the Impartiality index also be reason-
ably separated from what is measured by other popular indi-
cators of democracy or governance? That is, does the
Impartiality index also in practice relate to aspects of how
the aﬀairs of the government are conducted that are not
already captured by other indicators that have been used in
many previous studies in economics and political science?
In this sub-section, we discuss how the Impartiality index
relates to two popular indicators that are based on informa-
tion collected by experts and investors, the Quality of Govern-
ment and Polity2. As these are but two of many existing broad
and aggregated proxies for governance and democracy, the
primary objective of the discussion in this sub-section is not
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concepts relate to each other, but to provide a brief illustration
of the empirical added value of the Impartiality index. In the
next sub-section, we proceed by discussing more in detail
how the Impartiality index has evolved in a selection of coun-
tries.
Quality of Government combines assessments of the level of
corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. A higher
value indicates higher quality of government. We draw Quality
of Government from Teorell et al. (2015), but it is originally
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a set of
reports made by the consulting ﬁrm Political Risk Service
(PRS) Group as a service to their international clientele
(PRS Group, 2015). Given the market they cater for, it seems
likely that what the PRS Group summarizes as Quality of
Government is primarily what international investors would
perceive as unfair or negative for eﬃciency. Asked about the
fairness of government, the average citizen probably considers
a set of characteristics that does not fully overlap with those
considered by international investors. It is therefore possible
to have movements in the Impartiality index and the Quality
of Government going in diﬀerent directions. Figure 2 shows
how the Impartiality index measured in diﬀerent surveys relate
to Quality of Government for the same country and year. Qual-
ity of Government seems virtually uncorrelated with the Impar-
tiality index. This can also be seen from the correlation
coeﬃcient of 0.02 between the two indicators, see the corre-
lation matrix in Table 2. What we capture with the Impartial-
ity index is thus quite distinct from what the PRS Group
measure in order to create this indicator of governance.
The Polity IV-project’s Revised Combined Polity-score Poli-
ty2 (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) captures democracy in a formal
sense. A higher score on Polity2 indicates a more democratic
system. Polity2 is aggregated from various sub-indicators,
some of which clearly relate to the quality of democracy at
the central level of government rather than at the local level
(Woodruﬀ, 2006). Figure 3 shows how the Impartiality index
measured in diﬀerent waves relate to the Polity2-scores. While
they appear to be positively correlated for the sample as a
whole, suggesting that governments in more democratic coun-
tries treat their populations more impartially, countries can
also experience changes in the Impartiality index between sur-
vey waves without corresponding changes in their Polity2-
score. The Impartiality index is thus not simply an indicator
of formal aspects of democracy.Figure 2. Impartiality index and ICRG’s Quality of Government.In sum, also in practice the Impartiality index captures
something else than these two indicators of democracy and
governance. While this, in principle, suggests less of a need
to control for these two in our regressions, we include both
of them as control variables to reduce the omitted variables
bias.
(iii) The impartiality index in selected countries
To validate that the impartiality index indeed measures gov-
ernment impartiality, we discuss in this section the value and
evolution of the index in various African countries. In general,
it is clear that governments in Africa are often partial, and that
much of the partiality is along ethnic lines. However, as shown
by the range in the Impartiality index, there are also important
diﬀerences between countries in the degree of perceived impar-
tiality.
We ﬁrst consider Kenya, which is a rather typical case for
Sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya was a colonial construct with
about 40 diﬀerent ethnic groups. At independence, there was
a clear imbalance in inﬂuence between groups with the Kikuyu
being dominant. The politics since has largely been about
building coalitions to be able to rule, and these coalitions have
essentially been ethnically based. There is no pronounced left–
right dimension in Kenyan politics. Instead, much of public
policy has been debated and understood in terms of ethnic dis-
tribution. This suggests that government resources are used in
ways that are not primarily geared toward generating develop-
ment or growth for the country as a whole. It is no coincidence
that the book on the 2007 election by Wrong (2009) has the
title ‘‘It is our time to eat.” The Luo-dominated group, who
had previously been excluded from power, considered them-
selves as winners after the 2007 election and as such entitled
to a period in power, and to a shift in resources in their direc-
tion. Their focus was not how to make sure that the new gov-
ernment was impartial, although that has always been the
oﬃcial party line of all parties.
The three observations on the perception of impartiality for
Kenya show a gradual increase from 0.15 in 2003 to 0.24 in
2005 and to 0.27 in 2008. This is consistent with the events
in terms of governance on the ground in Kenya, and there
was also a gradual upward shift in economic growth until
the post-election drop in 2008. Mwai Kibaki became President
in December 2002, replacing Daniel arap Moi who had ruled
for 23 years and whose reign was characterized by extensive
government corruption and ethnic politics. Therefore,
Kibaki’s government started from an extremely low level of
perceived impartiality. His new party was called the National
Rainbow Coalition (NARC), signaling a desire to reduce
ethnic partiality. Immediately, he started an oﬃcial
anti-corruption campaign promising to end government
corruption. He put ministries and government corporations
on performance contract in 2005, to make them more account-
able, and took action to clean up the police force. In practice,
he also condoned various instances of corruption. It seems as
if his party was involved in the rigging of the December 2007
elections, which should have aﬀected perceptions in the oppo-
site direction. Still, Kibaki’s ﬁrst period was overall clearly a
move in the direction of more accountability than during the
Moi era. It is reasonable to assume that the combined eﬀect
of the new measures increased the faith in the impartiality of
the government. This supports the view that variation in our
indicator of government impartiality captures how govern-
ments have changed the way they interact with their citizens.
Another interesting case is South Africa. Under apartheid,
the country was at one extreme in terms of political inequality
along ethnic lines, although the implementation of these unjust
Table 2. Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Sustained growth 1.00
2 Log Impartiality index 0.11 1.00
(0.39)
3 Polity2 0.34 0.31 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
4 Log Gini 0.46 0.10 0.52 1.00
(0.00) (0.43) (0.00)
5 Log Linguistic fractionalization 0.26 0.30 0.18 0.12 1.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.39)
6 Log Ethnic fractionalization 0.23 0.11 0.20 0.39 0.32 1.00
(0.07) (0.37) (0.11) (0.00) (0.01)
7 Log Religious fractionalization 0.04 0.32 0.31 0.02 0.01 0.13 1.00
(0.77) (0.01) (0.01) (0.88) (0.92) (0.29)
8 Log National identity index 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.06 1.00
(0.48) (0.69) (0.70) (0.99) (0.49) (0.81) (0.68)
9 Log GDP per capita 0.38 0.11 0.27 0.58 0.02 0.40 0.04 0.15 1.00
(0.00) (0.40) (0.03) (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.77) (0.28)
10 Log Quality of Government 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.29 0.09 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.37 1.00
(0.73) (0.88) (0.68) (0.04) (0.51) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.01)
11 Log Internal conﬂict 0.08 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.17 0.39 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.30 1.00
(0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.32) (0.02) (0.21) (0.35) (0.11) (0.07)
12 Log Government consumption 0.33 0.15 0.26 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.27 0.00 0.12 0.30 0.21 1.00
(0.01) (0.24) (0.04) (0.41) (0.42) (0.07) (0.03) (0.98) (0.36) (0.03) (0.22)
13 Log Natural resource rents 0.23 0.05 0.37 0.54 0.15 0.43 0.42 0.37 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.22 1.00
(0.07) (0.67) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08)
14 Log Price level of investment 0.08 0.19 0.39 0.03 0.06 0.29 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.17 1.00
(0.51) (0.13) (0.00) (0.80) (0.65) (0.02) (0.29) (0.41) (0.10) (0.52) (0.62) (0.19) (0.18)
15 Inﬂation 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.22 0.39 0.30 0.22 0.04 0.13 0.28 0.34 0.02 1.00
(0.92) (0.39) (0.93) (0.68) (0.78) (0.09) (0.00) (0.03) (0.09) (0.76) (0.47) (0.03) (0.01) (0.86)
16 Log Real eﬀective exchange rate index 0.15 0.26 0.16 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.12 1.00
(0.23) (0.04) (0.23) (0.04) (0.85) (0.81) (0.57) (0.81) (0.38) (0.36) (0.72) (0.08) (0.96) (0.97) (0.37)
17 Log Population size 0.11 0.27 0.37 0.47 0.28 0.69 0.44 0.00 0.31 0.49 0.70 0.35 0.69 0.07 0.20 0.01 1.00
(0.38) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.58) (0.12) (0.96)
Notes: The table presents raw pair-wise correlations (p-values) for observations with data on both the Impartiality index and Sustained growth.
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Figure 3. Impartiality index and democracy.
GOVERNMENT IMPARTIALITY AND SUSTAINED GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 61laws may have been impartial (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). 6
Diﬀerential treatment of diﬀerent ethnic groups (white, col-
ored, African) was legislated. This led to a long struggle for
democracy, which ended in 1994 when the ﬁrst democratic
elections were held. The coming of majority rule eliminated
the legislative discrimination of certain ethnic groups. While,
as argued above, not mechanically related, it is likely that
the unjust content of the laws under apartheid also entailed
that these laws were implemented in a partial fashion, i.e., that
especially black citizens were discriminated against in the
implementation of policies (in addition to any discrimination
already enshrined in the laws). Hence, it seems natural that
perceptions of partiality should decline strongly as the apart-
heid system was dismantled. In addition, it is also likely that
when answering the question about being treated fairly by
the government, respondents not only take into account how
laws are implemented but also whether they explicitly stipulate
discriminatory practices. Our impartiality data do not cover
the 1990 s, but our impartiality index increased from 0.14 in
2000 to 0.49 in 2006 (followed by a drop to in 2008). The ini-
tial post-apartheid period saw falling per capita incomes until
2002, followed by a steady increase until the beginning of the
global ﬁnancial crisis. The increase in the impartiality index
seems reasonable given the elimination of laws favoring the
whites. Even the introduction of aﬃrmative action in favor
of Africans may be perceived by the majority as fair given pre-
vious injustices. The drop in 2008 may reﬂect disappointment
with the ability of the new government to live up to expecta-
tions. The case of South Africa highlights a potential discrep-
ancy between the theoretical concept of impartiality and our
indicator, the Impartiality index. The theoretical concept refers
only to the exercise of authority, and it would in principle be
possible to consider the apartheid system as impartial if it was
implemented with impartiality, but the Impartiality Index
could capture perceptions also about political equality, i.e.,
whether people feel there is impartiality in the access to polit-
ical power. However, since the question in the Afrobarometer
that we use to create the Impartiality index speciﬁcally refers to
how one’s group is ‘‘treated by the government,” we believe
that most respondents will understand it in terms of the exer-
cise of authority, rather than the access to power, and this
potential discrepancy will be of little practical importance in
our context.
Another type of ethnic division is between the Indian minor-
ity and the black majority in several African countries. In the
case of Uganda, the sizeable Indian group was successful inbusiness, which led to animosity against it in broad groups
of the population. When Idi Amin took power in 1971, he
soon started with a policy of expropriating the assets of the
Indian minority and then driving them out of the country.
This was a policy that early on had some support in the pop-
ulation, but the economic consequences for the country were
very negative. To control the country Amin also placed mem-
bers of from his ethic group, the Kakwas, and allied groups
from West Nile and South Sudan, into positions of power in
the government and in the army, while he persecuted other
ethnic groups, such as the Acholi and the Lango. Apart from
pursuing ethnically divisive policies, Amin’s regime was char-
acterized by corruption and ineﬃciency, political repression
and extensive human rights violations. During Amin’s eight-
year reign GDP per capita fell by over a third and the share
of industry in GDP fell from 13% to 4%.
There are, of course, also examples of countries that have
managed to handle ethnic diversity in a better way. It seems
easier to manage situations with numerous groups of moder-
ate size than when there are a few dominant groups competing
for power. In Tanzania, there are more than 120 ethnic groups
and none is large enough to dominate the political scene. After
independence in 1963, President Julius Nyerere embarked on a
mission of nation-building and African socialism. The latter
strategy did not manage to build an eﬃcient economy and
was essentially abandoned in the mid-1980, but the nation-
building eﬀort, including the attempt to establish Kiswahili
as the national language, was more successful. It may well
be that the sustained economic recovery, with stable growth
since the turn of the century, has been helped by the develop-
ment of a state acting with reasonable impartiality. We note
that our last observation for Tanzania for 2008 is as high as
0.63, while the number for Uganda in the same year was a
low 0.18.
(b) National identity
To complement the Impartiality index, we construct a
National identity index, reﬂecting social cohesion in the sense
that it measures the share of the population that has a stronger
attachment to their nation than to their (ethnic) group. More
speciﬁcally, the National identity index represents the share of
the population that identiﬁes more with their nation, i.e., the
country in which they live, rather than with their own group
or equally with both nation and group. The National identity
index can be coded from the second, third, and fourth wave
of the Afrobarometer. On average, one in two identiﬁes more
with their nation. The lowest and highest value on the
National identity index are for Nigeria in 2006 (17%) and Tan-
zania in 2006 (88%).
(c) Sustained growth
There is no consensus in the literature of what constitutes
sustained growth. Previous studies have focused on aspects
such as structural breaks or transitions between growth
regions, (Jerzmanowski, 2006; Kar, Pritchett, Raihan, &
Sen, 2013), growth accelerations (Hausmann et al., 2005),
growth collapses (Hausmann, Rodriguez, & Wagner, 2007),
duration of growth spells (Berg et al., 2012; Tsangarides,
2012), or both growth accelerations and growth maintenance
(Sen, 2013).
In this study, we are not investigating whether government
impartiality is speciﬁcally linked to only growth accelerations,
only growth decelerations, or only the length of growth spells.
Instead, we investigate whether government impartiality can
62 WORLD DEVELOPMENTexplain why some countries manage to sustain a reasonably
high GDP per capita growth for a number of years while other
countries either have low growth or occasionally have high
growth but cannot sustain it. We hold that this is a reasonable
approach given that data on our variable of interest, govern-
ment impartiality, is available only from the end of the
1990 s. The sample period is therefore quite short, and we
need a deﬁnition of sustained growth that provides us with a
suﬃciently large sample. To focus only on growth accelera-
tions or structural breaks would mean not searching for fac-
tors that characterize countries that year after year continues
to experience high growth. Further, if we focused on deceler-
ations or end of growth spells, we would lose observations
for countries that were still in a period of relatively high
growth at the end of our sample period. For instance, Liberia
has had a GDP per capita growth higher than 2% since 2005,
and Zambia since 2003. We do not know how long these
growth spells will last. It does not seem reasonable neither
to code them as ending in 2013, simply for the reason that
we do not know the future, nor to omit them from the analysis
on the basis that their growth spell is too long. Thus, while we
in principle agree with, e.g., Sen (2013) on the virtues of under-
standing transitions between diﬀerent growth phases, and
agree that structural breaks, growth accelerations, growth col-
lapses, and duration of spells are important, we believe that
ﬁndings based on our deﬁnition of sustained growth can add
to the literature.
A fairly common practice is to set the required threshold for
growth in the range of 2% to three and a half percent, and the
duration of growth spells are often required to be at least ﬁve
or eight years. In the deﬁnition of sustained growth used in the
baseline regressions, we follow this practice in principle but
still opt for a relatively generous deﬁnition of sustained
growth. We set Sustained growth to one if the growth rate in
GDP per capita (World Bank, 2015) is 2% or more during
the present and the next four years, i.e., for a period of at least
ﬁve consecutive years. If this condition is not met, we set this
variable to zero. We report robustness tests with other deﬁni-
tions. A threshold of 2% annual GDP per capita growth clo-
sely follows studies such as Berg et al. (2012). In their study,
Berg et al. (2012) analyze growth spells with a length of either
ﬁve or eight years. At the time of writing, the latest year forFigure 4. Share of years with Suwhich we could obtain growth in GDP per capita was 2013.
Since we regress Sustained growth on lagged government
impartiality, a threshold of ﬁve years means that 2008 would
be the latest year for which we could use data on Impartiality,
and a threshold of eight years means that 2005 would be the
latest year. Considering our short sample, we chose the less
restrictive threshold of ﬁve years. We provide evidence show-
ing that our conclusions are not excessively sensitive to this
choice. About one-ﬁfth of the country-years in this sample
had sustained growth during the sample period, see Table 1.
Figure 4 shows the average share of the years during 1999–
2009 that are coded as having sustained growth. In contrast to
what we saw for the Impartiality index, the East African coun-
tries seem to have done much better when it comes to acquir-
ing sustained growth.4. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND REGRESSION
ANALYSIS
(a) Empirical framework
The empirical speciﬁcation to be estimated as a linear prob-
ability model is
Sustained growthi;t ¼ aiþ c Impartiality indexi;t1þ bXXt þ ei;
where Xt is vector of controls and ei is an error term. Our main
interest is in the sign of c, i.e., whether government impartial-
ity is positively related to sustained growth.
The main reasons for endogeneity are reversed causality or
omitted variables. Given the cross-country sample and the
observational nature of our data, we cannot deal with those
issues by means of instrumental variables or similar
approaches that would rely on quasi-exogenous variation.
Instead, we deal with them in the following way. First, to
avoid direct reversed causality we always lag all explanatory
variables. We also test whether a history of sustained growth
feeds positively onto the Impartiality index, and ﬁnd that this
is likely not the case. Second, a bias due to the omission of true
correlates (an omitted variables bias) would be a concern if we
did not control for factors systematically correlated with bothstained growth (1999–2009).
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comprehensive set of control variables, considering our small
sample, as well as country ﬁxed eﬀects in some models, to limit
this potential threat, but admit that we cannot exclude it
entirely.
In most of our pooled OLS-speciﬁcations, standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. For the
ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations we cluster the standard errors at
the country level. Given that the number of clusters (countries)
is too low for ordinary clustering to be valid, we use the wild
bootstrap procedure (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2008).
(b) Empirical results
Consistent with the theoretical arguments presented in Sec-
tion 2, the probability of acquiring sustained economic growth
is higher when the perceived level of government impartiality
is higher. In Table 3, we present our main results and show
that this positive relationship is quite robust. In the ﬁrst col-
umn, we include the Impartiality index together with our indi-
cator for democracy, Polity2. Including the level of democracy
as a control is important since Polity2 and the Impartiality
index are positively correlated. Once the level of democracy
is held constant, a higher level on the Impartiality index
implies a higher probability of being on a sustained growthTable 3. Impartiality and sustained
(1) (2) (
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Poole
Dependent variable: Sustained growth
Log Impartiality index 0.18** 0.29** 0.
(0.09) (0.11) (0.
Polity2 0.04** 0.03 0
(0.02) (0.02) (0.
Log Gini 0.70** 0
(0.31) (0.
Log Linguistic fractionalization 0.14*** 0.1
(0.04) (0.
Log Ethnic fractionalization 0.15 0
(0.14) (0.
Log Religious fractionalization 0.26*** 0.2
(0.08) (0.
Log National identity index 0.
(0.
Log GDP per capita
Log Impartiality index * Log GDP
per capita
Log Quality of Government
Log Internal conﬂict
Future Log Impartiality
Additional control variables No No N
Country and year ﬁxed eﬀects No No N
Observations 62 57 4
Countries 20 18 1
R2 0.13 0.39 0.
Notes: Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses, small sa
Columns 1, 2, 4–6, and clustered by country using the wild bootstrap procedur
Time-varying explanatory variables are lagged one year. The additional contro
Log Price level of investment, Inﬂation, Log Real eﬀective exchange rate, andpath. At the same time, once Impartiality is held constant,
more democratic countries are less likely to have Sustained
growth. This negative relationship is in contrast to the ﬁndings
of Berg et al. (2012), who, using a world-wide sample found
that more democratic countries have longer growth spells.
However, we would not overemphasize the negative result
for democracy as it is sensitive to controlling for other country
characteristics, such as income inequality or formal institu-
tions. Yet, a possible explanation is that the democracy-
indicator, especially when used in a global sample, may pick
up other diﬀerences between groups of countries than just
their level of democracy, many of which could be expected
to vary less within our exclusively sub-Saharan African sam-
ple. A legacy of pre-colonial or colonial history could be
among these confounding factors.
If we extrapolate on the estimated coeﬃcient under the
assumption that the results reﬂect a causal relationship, start-
ing at the sample mean, a one-standard deviation higher frac-
tion of the population thinking that the government never
treats their ethnic group unfair would be associated with a 7
percentage-point higher likelihood of being on a sustained
growth path.
In the third to eighth columns, we addmore control variables
without qualitative eﬀects on the key estimate. While we could
use all 20 countries in the ﬁrst column, data availability makesgrowth in sub-Saharan Africa
3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
d OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE
(At least 2.0% GDP per capita growth for at least 5 consecutive years)
26* 1.80*** 0.35* 0.46* 0.46**
13) (0.52) (0.17) (0.23) (0.19)
.05* 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05
03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.04)
.63* 0.45 0.57 0.36
35) (0.38) (0.58) (2.02)
3*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.17*
04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
.18 0.24 0.21 0.09
18) (0.15) (0.36) (0.95)
6*** 0.32*** 0.42*** 0.52**
09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.21)
03
19)
0.29*** 0.01 0.02 1.14 1.51*
(0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (1.00) (0.83)
0.20***
(0.06)
0.43 0.66 0.38 1.22
(0.41) (0.59) (0.82) (0.73)
0.72 0.97
(0.56) (1.54)
0.14
(0.29)
o No No Yes Yes Yes
o No No No Yes Yes
7 57 35 34 50 50
8 18 14 14 16 16
39 0.45 0.53 0.58 0.26 0.35
mple adjusted in Columns 1 to 6, robust to arbitrary autocorrelation in
e (1,000 resamples) in Columns 7 and 8. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
l variables are Log Government consumption, Log Natural resource rents,
Log Population size.
64 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthe sample smaller as we add more control variables. Looking
the length of growth spells, Berg et al. (2012) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of fractionalization but a strong eﬀect of income inequal-
ity. However, Johnson et al. (2010) point to societal fractional-
ization as a potential obstacle for sustained growth for African
countries in general. From the correlation matrix, we see that
respondents living in countries more fragmented in terms of
language or religion more often also feel that the government
is not acting impartially, while ethnic fragmentation does not
seem to matter. Perceived impartiality is also slightly lower in
countries with more income inequality. Given this, we consider
indicators for income inequality as well as for fractionalization
along linguistic, ethnic, and religious lines as control variables
in the second column in Table 2. We draw Gini from World
Bank (2015), but since Gini is not reported for most years,
we use the ﬁrst available ﬁgure for each country after 1990.
The fractionalization indices are all from Alesina et al.
(2003). Holding these factors constant, the Impartiality index
is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level. Evidently, income
inequality is a predictor of sustained growth, but contrary to
the often-told tale of the perils of ethnolinguistic fragmenta-
tion, we ﬁnd that more fragmented countries in terms of lan-
guage and religion are more likely to acquire sustained
growth. More central to the topic of this paper is that, even
when we control for the possibly confounding eﬀects of income
inequality and societal fractionalization, it is clear that coun-
tries where people more seldom feel that their ethnic group is
treated unfairly by the government are more likely to acquire
sustained growth.
Though the results in the second column suggest that, for
these African countries, time-invariant indicators of fragmen-
tation may even be positively related to sustained growth,
fragmentation could still be problematic if people not just
belonged to diﬀerent groups but also identiﬁed relatively more
with their own group rather than with their country. If there
was a strong eﬀect of the salience of group identity, that
should show up as a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for a variable such
as the National identity index, but it does not. We include the
National identity index in the third column and it is both sta-
tistically and economically insigniﬁcant. When interacted with
the Impartiality index, neither the main estimates nor the inter-
action term are signiﬁcant (results not shown). The lack of sig-
niﬁcance for the National identity index could also be because
most of these sub-Saharan African countries are by interna-
tional comparison quite fragmented, and the real diﬀerence
in this respect may not be within this group of countries but
rather between these countries and other countries in the
world. While it may not be possible to generalize to other
regions, we conclude that fragmentation or the salience of
group identities probably do not constitute important imped-
iment to sustained growth for these countries.
The countries that have acquired sustained growth are on
average poorer. Hence, an interesting question is whether
the Impartiality index is more strongly related to sustained
growth among relatively poor countries. The motivation for
including an interaction term between government impartial-
ity and the income level is that, though exceptions are not hard
to ﬁnd, as a general rule more developed countries have more
robust formal institutions and stronger civil societies that
enable citizens to demand equal treatment and that their rights
are respected. We therefore expect negative eﬀects stemming
from low levels on the Impartiality index to be especially prob-
lematic in less developed countries. The results in the fourth
column, where we include GDP per capita (World Bank,
2015) and interact it with the Impartiality index, are consistentwith this reasoning. Low levels of the index are thus more of a
hindrance in initially poor countries.
The experience of and risk for internal violent conﬂict could
be reﬂected both in less perceived impartiality and less ability
to sustain growth once it emerges. We use an indicator from
ICRG that combines assessments of the risks for civil war,
coups, or civil disorder. On this indicator, Internal Conﬂict,
a higher value means a lower risk. The data is drawn from
Teorell et al. (2015). From the correlation matrix, we see that
the perceived level of government impartiality is, as expected,
higher where there is a lower risk for internal conﬂict. We add
our two indicators from ICRG, Internal Conﬂict and Quality
of Government, in the ﬁfth column. Due to limited data avail-
ability the sample shrinks considerably, which could con-
tribute to these two indicators not being signiﬁcantly related
to sustained growth. The lack of signiﬁcance could also be
caused by multicollinerarity, but since we are interested pri-
marily in the relationship between the Impartiality index and
Sustained growth, multicollinearity among the other indepen-
dent variables is of little importance in our context. In results
not shown, we re-estimated the speciﬁcation without the two
indicators from ICRG but using the same sample as in the ﬁfth
column. The coeﬃcient for the Impartiality index was hardly
aﬀected (Coeﬀ: 0.38; S.E.: 0.17). This moderate eﬀect clearly
suggests that our indicator for government impartiality is
not capturing the role of formal institutions, which one may
otherwise have had good reason to expect. The Impartiality
index may instead be seen as an indicator of the quality of a
particular form of informal institutions.
In the sixth column, we add more variables that may be
important in the African context. We admit the endogenous
nature of the variables we add as controls here, as for those
added in previous columns, but they serve to establish the
robustness of the main results and additionally reveal interest-
ing associations. Berg et al. (2012) ﬁnd that external shocks
can end growth spells, and it is then understandable that the
risk falls with export sophistication and openness. We seek
to pick the latter eﬀect up by using the variable Natural
resource rents as share of GDP (World Bank, 2015) to indicate
lack of export diversiﬁcation and the Real eﬀective exchange
rate index (Darvas, 2012) to measure openness or external
competitiveness. The rate of consumer-price Inﬂation (World
Bank, 2015) is a proxy for the soundness of macroeconomic
policies, and the Price level of investment (Feenstra, Inklaar,
& Timmer, 2013) captures the user cost of capital. Economic
growth is in theory tightly linked to investments, but we
include the price level of investment as it is less problematic
in this setting than the investment rate as such, though it
can still be endogenous. By expanding government consump-
tion, governments could both appease unruly groups and cre-
ate tensions between those that receive more and those that
receive less. As a control, we therefore include Government
consumption as a share of GDP, drawn from the Penn World
Tables (Feenstra et al., 2013). The Impartiality index is nega-
tively correlated with the size of the population, possibly
because it is harder to please all segments of larger populations
and that the perceived level of impartiality therefore will be
lower in larger countries. Population size and growth could
also be linked to the possibility of acquiring sustained growth,
wherefore we include Population size (World Bank, 2015) as a
control. Because of the limited size of our data set, we are con-
strained in terms of the number of control variables that can
be included jointly. When we add both ICRG measures, the
sample shrinks considerably. In order to retain sample size
we drop Internal Conﬂict when we in the sixth column include
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economic structure of the economy. Importantly, the estimate
of the Impartiality index is not weakened when we include
these additional control variables, rather the opposite.
Also within-country variation in the impartiality of the gov-
ernment is related to sustained growth. The ﬁxed eﬀects spec-
iﬁcation in the seventh column shows that once time-invariant
factors, which could include, e.g., matters related to history or
geography, and here need only be invariant over period after
1999, are held constant, the Impartiality index is a still a pos-
itive correlate with Sustained growth. All our ﬁxed eﬀects spec-
iﬁcations include year dummies, to deal with shocks common
to all countries, and the standard errors are clustered at the
country level. Since the number of clusters (countries) is on
the low side, we use the wild bootstrap procedure to estimate
the standard errors. The results suggest that if the impartiality
of the government improves, so does the chance of obtaining
reasonably high growth over a period of at least ﬁve years.
Here, the imagined one-standard deviation increase govern-
ment impartiality means a 19 percentage-points increase in
probability of sustained growth.
Outside the controlled environment of a lab, one can never
completely rule out the possibility of an omitted variables bias.
However, considering that the qualitative result is the same
also when country ﬁxed eﬀects are included, one can be rea-
sonably certain that diﬀerences between the countries in our
sample that are constant over the post-1999 sample period
are not causing such a bias. That is, our results do not reﬂect
the impact of factors such as geographical conditions, pre-
colonial, colonial, or post-independence history, past or pre-
sent structure of the population or the economy, deep formal
or informal institutions, or a history of civil war. Since we
include year ﬁxed eﬀects, neither common external shocks,
such as global business cycles, are likely to cause an omitted
variables bias. At the same time, to drive our results, the omit-
ted factor must be such that it is not captured by indicators for
formal aspects of democracy or the quality of formal institu-
tions, nor by the level of income or by various macroeconomic
indicators, such as government size, inﬂation, the costs of
investment, real exchange rates, or natural resource rents.
While we do not argue that there cannot be factors that
have these properties, we are not aware of any obvious
candidates.Table 4. Impartiality an
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Sustained growth (At least __
con
Duration threshold (years) 5 4
Growth threshold (%) 2 2
Log Impartiality index 0.46** 0.55*
(0.19) (0.32)
Time-varying control variables Yes Yes
Country and year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 50 50
Countries 16 16
R2 0.26 0.40
Sample year range [2000–09] [2000–09]
Positives [Fraction of sample] 13 [0.26] 11 [0.22]
Notes: Estimated with OLS. In parentheses are robust standard errors, clus
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All explanatory variables are lagged one year
Quality of government, Log Government consumption, Log Natural resource
rate, Log Population size.Can we be reasonably certain that we are not capturing
that sustained growth leads to respondents having positive
assessments of their government? We believe so. In the last
column, we include the ﬁrst lead of the Impartiality index
instead of the lagged value. This future value has no predictive
power. The coeﬃcient is close to zero, and the p-value is 0.68.
In Table 6 in the Appendix, we even reversed the speciﬁcation
used in the seventh column in Table 3 and set the present value
on the Impartiality index as the dependent variable and
(lagged) values of Sustained growth as one of the explanatory
variables. The estimate for Sustained growth switches from
positive to negative depending on the number of years it is
lagged, and is far from signiﬁcant up to the sixth lag, where
we get a negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Thus,
if anything, a history of Sustained growth is associated with
lower levels of perceived impartiality, suggesting that our
results may be biased downward. While we cannot determine
the lag structure of the ‘‘true model,” we are therefore reason-
ably conﬁdent that impartiality has a positive impact on sub-
sequent growth patterns rather than the reverse. That is, we
are not capturing that sustained growth leads to higher levels
of government impartiality but the opposite.
Overall, our empirical results demonstrate that a lack of
government impartiality could be a real hindrance to sustained
growth. As outlined in Section 2, we primarily envisage the
theoretical link from government impartiality to sustained
growth as going via less ethno-regional favoritism, less room
for rent-seeking, and more stability in economic and political
conditions. With the data at hand, we cannot identify the rel-
ative importance of these potential mechanisms. We can say
with some certainty that the estimated coeﬃcients for the
Impartiality index are not capturing the role of objective levels
of societal fractionalization or income inequality, the role of
formal aspects of democracy or the quality of formal institu-
tions, nor the level of income or various macroeconomic indi-
cators. More research is needed to pinpoint the exact
mechanisms and to cleanly separate the role of real versus per-
ceived impartiality.
(c) More robustness checks
In Table 4, we present results from a series of robustness
checks. We have so far followed Berg et al. (2012) in using ad sustained growth
(3) (4) (5) (6)
% GDP per capita growth for at least __
secutive years)
Annual growth rate
6 5 5
2 1.5 2.5
0.71** 0.75** 0.40 6.65
(0.32) (0.34) (0.24) (5.31)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
35 50 50 50
14 16 16 16
0.74 0.42 0.35 0.56
[2000–07] [2000–09] [2000–09] [2000–09]
9 [0.26] 16 [0.32] 11 [0.22] NA
tered by country using the wild bootstrap procedure (1,000 resamples).
. The time-varying control variables are Polity2, Log GDP per capita, Log
rents, Log Price level of investment, Inﬂation, Log Real eﬀective exchange
66 WORLD DEVELOPMENTper capita growth of rate 2% as the growth threshold. Now we
test alternative thresholds for what to code as sustained
growth, and while the results do not falsify the overall
conclusion that the Impartiality index is positively related to
sustained growth, they indicate that the results are sensitive
to which thresholds one chooses to use. We repeat our ‘‘bench-
mark” speciﬁcation, from the seventh column in Table 3, in
the ﬁrst column in Table 4. In this sample, one in four obser-
vations has a growth rate of 2% or more that year and the fol-
lowing four years.
First, we change the number of years of growth at or above
2% that is required for it to be coded as sustained. Lowering the
year threshold to four years gives us the same qualitative
results, but the coeﬃcient for the estimate of the Impartiality
index is less statistically signiﬁcant. Increasing the year thresh-
old to six years can be done without damage to the statistical
signiﬁcance of the index. Second, we adjust the growth thresh-
old. If we lower this threshold by half a percentage point, to
one and a half percent, the share with sustained growth
increases to one in three and the Impartiality index is still signif-
icant at the ﬁve-percent level. If the threshold is raised to two
and a half percent, the coeﬃcient for the Impartiality index is
on the same order of magnitude, but no longer statistically sig-
niﬁcant. The results are thus robust to some changes to thresh-
olds, but cannot be generalized to any thresholds. To further
test the eﬀect of government impartiality on economic growth,
without considering whether it is sustained or not, we use
annual growth in GDP per capita as the dependent in the last
column. The Impartiality index is positive but not statistically
signiﬁcant. Our interpretation of these results is that, while
more impartial governments can help countries stay on a path
of moderately positive growth for a decent number of years, it
is not a suﬃcient condition that ensures that the growth rate
during those years is also at a consistently high level.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The literature recognizes that a key problem for low-
income countries is not only how to obtain high growth
but how to sustain it over a period of several years. In this
paper, we study sustained growth, which we deﬁne as a
growth rate in GDP per capita of at least 2% for a period
of at least ﬁve consecutive years, in a sample of 20 sub-
Saharan African countries. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether the
government’s impartiality and salience of group identities
matter. We ﬁnd that when the government is seen as impar-
tial, there is greater prospect for sustained growth, but that
the salience of group identity seems not to matter. A stan-
dard deviation increase in the population share that sees
the government as treating their group fairly is associated
with an increase in the probability of obtaining sustained
growth in a range from about seven to 19 percentage points.
While causality remains an issue, we believe that a reasonable
policy conclusion is that also moderate improvements in the
impartiality of the governments in these countries would be a
vital step for ensuring lasting growth in Africa, and possibly
elsewhere in the developing world.
We have focused in this paper on ethnic impartiality given
the salience of the ethnic question. An interesting avenue for
future work is to study the eﬀect of other types of impartiality
on sustained growth. For example, besides being impartial
toward diﬀerent ethnicities, it may also be important that Afri-
can governments are impartial toward diﬀerent religions or
economic classes (e.g., the poor) if they want to facilitate sus-
tained growth. From a policy perspective, it will be interesting
to establish the absolute and relative eﬀects of these diﬀerent
dimensions of impartiality.NOTES1. The countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
2. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), and Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) oﬀer similar evidence for the negative economic and
political consequences of ethnic fractionalization and/or polarization.
3. An example for such developments is Malaysia, where the economic
success of the Chinese minority led to policies that explicitly advantaged
the Malay majority. However, authors diﬀer in their evaluation of the
economic consequences of these policies (Jono, 2004). That is, Malaysia
did relatively well economically despite pursuing potentially impartial
policies. On the other hand, it is possible that it would have grown evenmore with more partial policies. For example, its neighbor Singapore,
which was careful to treat all national ethnicities equally, did better
economically than Malaysia at similar levels of ethnic diversity.
4. Bhalla and Luo (2013) note that the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir
are poorer than the Hindus and that the Uighurs are poorer than the Han
in China, suggesting that ethnic (religious) inequality might be possible
explanations for the smoldering conﬂicts in these two regions.
5. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us in the direction of
investigating these aspects.
6. We thank a reviewer for making us aware of this potential shortcom-
ing of the concept of impartiality.REFERENCESAcemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling institutions. Journal of
Political Economy, 113(5), 949–995.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins
of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American
Economic Review, 91(5), 1369–1401.Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of
power, prosperity and poverty. New York: Crown Publishers (Random
House).
Afrobarometer, The. (2013). Available from <www.afrobarometer.
org>.
GOVERNMENT IMPARTIALITY AND SUSTAINED GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 67Ahlerup, P., & Hansson, G. (2011). Nationalism and government
eﬀectiveness. Journal of Comparative Economics, 39, 431–451.
Ahlerup, P., & Isaksson, A.-S. (2015). Ethno-regional favouritism in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Kyklos, 68(2), 143–152.
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic
divisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1243–1284.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R.
(2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 155–194.
Alesina, A., Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2015). Ethnic
inequality. Journal of Political Economy (in press).
Alesina, A., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2011). Segregation and the quality of
government in a cross section of countries. American Economic Review,
101(5), 1872–1911.
Arbache, J., & Page, J. (2010). How fragile is Africa’s recent growth?
Journal of African Economies, 19, 1–24.
Baldwin, K., & Huber, J. (2010). Economic versus cultural diﬀerences:
Forms of ethnic diversity and public goods provision. American
Political Science Review, 104(4), 644–662.
Bandyopadhyay, S., & Green, E. (2013). Nation-building and conﬂict in
modern Africa. World Development, 45, 108–118.
Berg, A., Ostry, J. D., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2012). What makes growth
sustained? Journal of Development Economics, 98, 149–166.
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity: Property
rights, taxation, and politics. American Economic Review, 99(4),
1218–1244.
Bhalla, A. S., & Luo, D. (2013). Poverty and exclusion of minorities in
China and India. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cameron, C. A., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008). Bootstrap-based
improvements for inference with clustered errors. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 90, 414–427.
Cingolani, L., Thomsson, K., & de Crombrugghe, D. (2015). Minding
weber more than ever? The impacts of state capacity and bureaucratic
autonomy on development goals. World Development, 72, 191–207.
Darvas, Z. (2012). Real eﬀective exchange rates for 178 countries: A new
database, Bruegel working papers 2012/06.
Dincecco, M., & Prado, M. (2012). Warfare, ﬁscal capacity, and
performance. Journal of Economic Growth, 17, 171–203.
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and
ethnic divisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1203–1250.
Easterly, W., Ritzen, J., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Social cohesion,
institutions, and growth. Economics & Politics, 18, 103–120.
Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R., & Timmer, M. P. (2013). The next generation
of the Penn World Table Available from <www.ggdc.net/pwt>.
Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D., & Weinstein, J. (2008). Is
ethnic conﬂict inevitable? Better institutions, not partition? Foreign
Aﬀairs, 87, 138–141.
Hausmann, R., Pritchett, L., & Rodrik, D. (2005). Growth accelerations.
Journal of Economic Growth, 10, 303–329.
Hausmann, R., Rodriguez, F., & Wagner, R. (2007). Growth collapses.
Mimeo.
Hodler, R., & Raschky, P. (2014). Regional favoritism. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 129(2), 995–1033.
Jerzmanowski, M. (2006). Empirics of hills, plateaus, mountains and
plains: A Markow-switching approach to growth. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 81, 357–385.
Johnson, S., Ostry, J. D., & Subramanian, A. (2010). Prospects for
sustained growth in Africa: Benchmarking the constraints. IMF Staﬀ
Papers, 57, 119–171.
Jono, K. S. (2004). The new economic policy and interethnic relations in
Malaysia, Identities, conﬂict and cohesion – Programme paper number
7. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.Kar, S., Pritchett, L., Raihan, S., & Sen, K. (2013). Looking for a break:
Identifying transitions in growth regimes. Journal of Macroeconomics,
38, 151–166.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2008). Governance matters
VII: Aggregate and individual governance indicators for 1996–2007,
World Bank policy research paper no 4654 .
Kramon, E., & Posner, D. (2012). Ethnic favoritism in primary education in
Kenya, mimeo. Mimeo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology &
University of California, Los Angeles).
Kyriacou, A. (2013). Ethnic group inequalities and governance: Evidence
from developing countries. Kyklos, 66(1), 78–101.
La Porta, R., Lopes-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C., & Schleifer, A.
(2008). The economic consequences of legal origins. Journal of
Economic Literature, 46, 285–332.
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2002). Polity IV project: political regime
characteristics and transitions, 1800–2002, dataset users’ manual.
Mimeo (University of Maryland).
Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in
Kenya versus Tanzania. World Politics, 56, 327–362.
Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005). Ethnic diversity and
economic development. Journal of Development Economics, 76(2),
293–323.
Museru, M., Toerien, F., & Gossel, S. (2014). The impact of aid and
public investment volatility on economic growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa. World Development, 57, 138–147.
Posner, D. N. (2004). Measuring ethnic fractionalization in Africa.
American Journal of Political Science, 48, 849–863.
Pritchett, L. (2000). Understanding patterns of economic growth:
Searching for hills among plateaus, mountains, and plains. World
Bank Economic Review, 14, 221–250.
PRS Group. (2015). <https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-
methodologies/icrg>.
Ravallion, M., & Chen, S. (2012). Monitoring inequality. Mimeo (World
Bank), Available online at: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/develop-
menttalk/ﬁles/developmenttalk/monitoring_inequality_table_1_.pdf>.
Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What is quality of government? A
theory of impartial government institutions. Governance, 21(2),
165–190.
Sen, K. (2013). The political dynamics of economic growth. World
Development, 47, 71–86.
Teorell, J. (2009). The impact of quality of government as impartiality:
Theory and evidence. Paper presented at the 2009 APSA meeting.
Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Hartmann, F., &
Svensson, R. (2015). The quality of government standard dataset.
Version: January 2015. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of
Government Institute, Available from: <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>.
The World Bank (2015). World Development Indicators Online (WDI)
database. Data retrieved on January 22, 2015. Available from
databank.worldbank.org.
Tilly, C. (1992). Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990–1992.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Tsangarides, C. G. (2012). Determinants of growth spells: Is Africa
diﬀerent? IMF working paper WP/12/227 .
Woodruﬀ, C. (2006). Measuring institutions. In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.),
International handbook on the economics of corruption (pp. 105–124).
Cheltenham: Edward Edgar.
Wrong, M. (2009). It’s our time to eat: The story of a Kenyan
Whistleblower. London: Fourth Estate.
Table 5. The Impartiality index by country and year
Country Survey (Year) Impartiality index Country Survey (Year) Impartiality index
Benin 2005 0.48 Malawi 2005 0.32
Benin 2008 0.53 Malawi 2008 0.53
Burkina Faso 2008 0.60 Namibia 1999 0.29
Botswana 1999 0.52 Namibia 2003 0.30
Botswana 2003 0.34 Namibia 2005 0.38
Botswana 2005 0.72 Namibia 2008 0.31
Botswana 2008 0.76 Nigeria 2000 0.22
Cape Verde 2002 0.30 Nigeria 2003 0.16
Cape Verde 2005 0.54 Nigeria 2005 0.18
Cape Verde 2008 0.33 Nigeria 2008 0.12
Ghana 2002 0.58 Senegal 2002 0.72
Ghana 2005 0.52 Senegal 2005 0.76
Ghana 2008 0.47 Senegal 2008 0.79
Kenya 2003 0.15 Tanzania 2001 0.46
Kenya 2005 0.24 Tanzania 2003 0.27
Kenya 2008 0.27 Tanzania 2005 0.54
Liberia 2008 0.63 Tanzania 2008 0.63
Lesotho 2000 0.23 Uganda 2000 0.21
Lesotho 2003 0.20 Uganda 2002 0.21
Lesotho 2005 0.86 Uganda 2005 0.34
Lesotho 2008 0.67 Uganda 2008 0.18
Madagascar 2005 0.87 South Africa 2000 0.14
Madagascar 2008 0.88 South Africa 2002 0.24
Mali 2001 0.41 South Africa 2006 0.49
Mali 2002 0.54 South Africa 2008 0.33
Mali 2005 0.75 Zambia 1999 0.16
Mali 2008 0.69 Zambia 2003 0.24
Mozambique 2002 0.48 Zambia 2005 0.45
Mozambique 2005 0.71 Zambia 2009 0.57
Mozambique 2008 0.50 Zimbabwe 1999 0.08
Malawi 1999 0.39 Zimbabwe 2004 0.35
Malawi 2003 0.16 Zimbabwe 2009 0.49
Notes: Countries and years for which the Impartiality index can be coded from the Afrobarometer (2013).
APPENDIX A
Table 6. Testing for direct reversed causality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of years all explanatory variables are lagged: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable: Log Impartiality index
Sustained Growth 0.16 0.26 0.34 0.21 0.18 0.37**
(0.24) (0.21) (0.42) (0.22) (0.16) (0.14)
Polity2 0.08 0.03* 0.04*** 0.05 0.03* 0.04*
(0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Log GDP per capita 2.14* 2.51*** 2.57 1.77 1.25 0.75*
(1.25) (0.87) (1.62) (1.55) (0.90) (0.42)
Log Quality of Government 0.34 0.59 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.21
(0.56) (0.53) (0.42) (1.97) (0.58) (0.20)
Log Government consumption 0.33 0.64 0.71 0.27 0.15 0.55***
(0.45) (0.44) (0.64) (0.34) (0.34) (0.00)
Log Natural resource rents 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.23 0.02 0.11
(0.09) (0.25) (0.11) (0.26) (0.13) (0.25)
Log Price level of investment 0.01 0.39 0.33 0.24 0.41 0.35***
(0.54) (0.44) (0.68) (0.37) (0.50) (0.12)
Inﬂation 0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Log Real eﬀective exchange rate 0.37 0.61 0.26 0.17 0.45 0.19
(0.55) (0.44) (0.40) (0.44) (0.38) (0.65)
Line missing
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Table 6 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of years all explanatory variables are lagged: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Log Population size 3.37 3.17 2.64 6.92 3.21 4.10
(3.20) (3.06) (8.56) (4.40) (3.66)
50 49 49 49 48
16 16 16 16 15
0.33 0.48 0.50 0.62 0.75
clustered by country using the wild bootstrap procedure (1,000 resamples).
ed in all speciﬁcations.
GOVERNMENT IMPARTIALITY AND SUSTAINED GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 69Impartiality and national identityThe Impartiality index is coded from the ﬁrst four waves of
the Afrobarometer surveys and the National identity index is
coded from the second, third, and fourth wave.
Fourth wave (2008–09)
Question Q79 is an open-ended question that asks ‘‘What is
your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.”
Question Q82 asks ‘‘How often are ____s [R’s Ethnic
Group] treated unfairly by the government?” We give each
respondent the value one if the answer is ‘‘Never”, and zero
if the answer is ‘‘Sometimes,” ‘‘Often,” or ‘‘Always.” We use
the sample weights of each respondent to calculate the Impar-
tiality index as the share of the population that has a value of
one.
Question Q83 asks ‘‘Let us suppose that you had to choose
between being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a [R’s Eth-
nic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feel-
ings?” We give each respondent the value one if the answer
is ‘‘I feel only [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.]” or ‘‘I Feel More
[Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] than (r’s groups)” and zero if the
answer is ‘‘I Feel Only (r’s group),” ‘‘I Feel More (r’s group),”
or ‘‘I feel equally [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.].”We use the sample
weights of each respondent to calculate the National identity
index as the share of the population that has a value of one.
Third wave (2005–06)
Question Q79 is an open-ended question that asks ‘‘What is
your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.”
Question Q81 asks ‘‘How often are ____s [respondent’s
identity group] treated unfairly by the government?” We give
each respondent the value one if the answer is ‘‘Never”, and
zero if the answer is ‘‘Sometimes,” ‘‘Often,” or ‘‘Always.”
We use the sample weights of each respondent to calculate
the Impartiality index as the share of the population that has
a value of one.
Question Q82 asks ‘‘Let us suppose that you had to choose
between being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a [respon-
dent’s identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel
most strongly attached to?”We give each respondent the value
one if the answer is ‘‘I feel only [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.]” or ‘‘I
(4.02)
Observations 50
Countries 16
R2 0.46
Notes: Estimated with OLS. In parentheses are robust standard errors,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Year and country ﬁxed eﬀects are includFeel More [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] than (r’s groups)” and
zero if the answer is ‘‘I Feel Only (r’s group),” ‘‘I Feel More
(r’s group),” or ‘‘I feel equally [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.].” We
use the sample weights of each respondent to calculate the
National identity index as the share of the population that
has a value of one.
Second wave (2002–04)
Question Q54 is an open-ended question that asks ‘‘Besides
being [national identity], which speciﬁc group do you feel you
belong to ﬁrst and foremost?”
Question Q56 asks ‘‘How often are ____s [respondent’s
identity group] treated unfairly by the government?” We give
each respondent the value one if the answer is ‘‘Never”, and
zero if the answer is ‘‘Sometimes,” ‘‘Often,” or ‘‘Always.”
We use the sample weights of each respondent to calculate
the Impartiality index as the share of the population that has
a value of one.
Question Q57 asks ‘‘Let us suppose that you had to choose
between being a [national identity] and being a [respondent’s
identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most
strongly attached to?” We give each respondent the value
one if the answer is ‘‘National identity” and zero if the answer
is ‘‘Group identity.” We then use the sample weights of each
respondent to calculate the National identity index as the share
of the population that has a value of one.
First wave (1999–2001)
Identity is an open-ended question of which group, beside
the nation, that the respondent feel that they belong to ﬁrst
and foremost.
Pfrfai. While there are nuances, in most of the countries
included in this wave it asks ‘‘To what extent are [members
of your identity group] people treated unfairly by the govern-
ment?” We give respondent the value one if the answer is
‘‘Never”, and zero if the answer is ‘‘Always”, ‘‘To a large
extent/most of the time,” ‘‘To some extent/some of the time,”
or ‘‘Hardly at all.” We use the sample weights of each respon-
dent to calculate the Impartiality index as the share of the pop-
ulation that has a value of one.ScienceDirect
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